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The relation between physicians and the pharmaceutical companies 
has been increasingly discretted issue over the last several years.  
Moreover, such relations have been proven to influence the 
prescribing patterns to stimulate drug supplying within hospitals, to 
encourage publications and research articles and even to contribute to 
critical article non-publication. 
There is a complex relation between physicians, medical organizations 
and academic departments, on the one hand and industry on the other. 
Therefore, industry makes its living from the physicians prescriptions and 
from the devices and services they purchase.  
Yet physicians, medical organizations, and academic departments 
commonly receive money and other benefits from the industry. 
This paper reviews specialist literature and addresses the real 
dimension of the physician-health related industry worldwide interaction. 
Unfortunately, Romania has not provided any data yet, because this issue has 
not been officially analyzed in our country. 
Key-words: health industries, relationship marketing for healthcare 
organizations 
 




A growing body of literature continues to seriously question the 
correctness of most types of physician–industry relations and to suggest ways to 
remove them. So for, physicians have continuously and faithfully preserved their 
partaking of industry generosity because they consider themselves too smart to 
have their medical decision influenced by industry’s marketing strategy (Rutledge 
P., 2003). This approach has survived although it is not factually supported and is 
highly arguable. According to an axiom that is hard to grasp when dealing with 
health related industries all industries have one purpose: to make money (Goldratt 
E., 2004). No professional ethics can obstruct this aim.  
These legends and similar ones persist in spite of an extensive and broadly 
accepted body of literature that categorically shows that industry–physician 
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conflict of interest – including industry’s expanding role in continuing medical 
education (Spingarn, Berlin, and Strom 1996) – increases the cost of healthcare to 
the detriment of the public, the medical profession, and the patients (Wazana, 
2000). In order to face and maybe to repel the physician-industry relation concerns, 
the American Medical Association (AMA), the pharmaceutical industry, and 
medical organizations have formulated guidelines to deal with such concerns 
(America, 2004; Popp et al., 2004; Association, 1998). On the other hand, a closer 
look at these guidelines reveals their bran interpretation possibility. Conflict of 
interest has always been a part of medicine.  With every patient treated, every 
physician it involved in a conflict of interests (Tonelli, 2007). 
Literature provides a lot of information on industry’s attempts to maneuver 
physicians away from their responsibility to serve the best interests of their 
patients. In the end, it is physicians who, as gatekeepers, control industry’s success 
through the prescriptions they give and the devices they procure. Undoubtly, 
industry uses large amounts of money to persuade physicians, but by means of a 
technique that makes physicians consider that they are not being influenced (Chren, 
1999). A 2006 report by Steinman and associates deals with the precise issue of 
Parke-Davis’s illegal marketing of its medicine Neurontin for off-label uses 
(Steinman et al., 2006). More than $40 million were spent on marketing the off-
label use of the drug to physicians. This activity was illegal. Prescriptions for off-
label use climbed. Much of the marketing campaign involved activities with hidden 
marketing intention such as funding for speakers bureaus and key opinion leaders. 
Unexpectedly, the industry – pharmaceutical and device – acts like any other for-
profit entity, seeking. The interesting part, though, is the extent in which industry 
hazes the distinction between marketing and education (Steinman et al., 2006) and 
lucrative investments the physicians naïvely facilitating the industry efforts.  
 
The physician perspective 
For physicians industry is a stimulating environment. It is unfair to 
generalize and say that every physician has the same motivations when dealing 
with industry, but it is important to evaluate a few persuasive ones, one or more of 
which may be relevant to a particular individual. 
Firstly, the doctors may see themselves as being entitled to whatever 
industry offers them (Hayashi, 2001). This sense of entitlement could have more 
reasons. Sometimes, they believed they worked very hard and that those freebies 
were a proof of the company’s appreciation. The gifts continued and increased 
during residency and practice – lunches brought in by medicine representatives 
during a seminar about a new treatment, or simply as an opportunity to eat 
conveniently.  
Consistently, industry speakers support the physicians’ prescribing 
behavior by affirming that it is an affront to physicians’ intellect even to suggest 
that their honesty can be bought for a dinner or a pen. If prescribing patterns 
(Greene, 2007) and, perhaps, personal features are promising to a company, they 
may be invited to a resort for an “advisors” summit or the like – some way to raise 
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the ante toward further eliciting our thanks in the form of more prescriptions for the 
company’s products and, maybe, becoming a company presenter to help persuade 
others to recommend more of these drugs.  
A second possible reason for the physician – industry interaction is 
recognition. Many of them enjoy to be acknowledged as experts, and when 
industry turns them into experts by choosing one of them on the circuit, his name 
and sometimes his photo are printed in programme. When he speaks at a meeting, 
fellow physicians come to hear him. This can be an exciting feeling. Then, they are 
sometimes tapped as key opinion leader and think that this makes them special, 
although this acknowledgment makes it obvious that they have been converted into 
salespeople for industry (Network, 2004).  
 By responding to the acknowledgment industry arranges for physicians, 
they are helping industry to cover sophisticated marketing techniques under the 
appearance of teaching. Some of them may be so good at what industry gets them 
to do that they are invited to be on a company’s scientific advisory board. This 
recognition makes them believe that they are even more allowed to expenses from 
industry because, after all, the statement advice entails that they are using their 
knowledge and intelligence to assist the company. Actually, they may think that 
they are entitled to large payments for being on this advisory board. Although 
industry does have physicians who provide them with essential guidance regarding 
drug development and marketing, many industry scientific advisory boards are 
simply ways to set up appreciation and enhanced allegiance among renowned 
physicians. Industry’s business policy is to convert its “advisors” into salespeople. 
The companies the advisory boards of which consist of world-wide 
members are even more inspired, because they are organize board conferences in 
remote and interesting places. The international acknowledgment for advisory 
board members is even puffier. Physicians may believe they are entitled to money 
and fancy trips, but they are not aware of the fact that by accepting the money and 
the trappings, they generate conflict, and contribute to expensive drug prescription, 
to uncertified device purchase, and to non-evidence-based tests ordering. All these 
increases the patients’ expulses and the cost of health. Why would industry spend 
millions of dollars on such as honoraria, traveling, and on steak dinners for the 
attendees if industry did not know that such expenditures world lead to more drug 
prescriptions or to increased device purchase? (C., 2004). 
Another reason underlying the physician-industry relation is the sense of 
belonging that such a relation creates. For the individual practitioner, an invitation 
to a fine steakhouse for dinner provides the chance to mingle with colleagues 
whom the company believes are worth inviting. The sense of being special is 
created by the company. Moreover, he has the chance to mingle with the out-of-
town speakers. Physicians who do not care to partake of industry’s largesse face a 
particularly difficult problem because attendance to meetings and interacting with 
colleagues is part of physicians’ professional responsibilities and necessary often 
simply for them to do their jobs. 
A fourth reason for physicians to go into and preserve relation with 
industry, which is, in fact, the underlying reason is money. Industry pays them for 
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being  speakers, for participating in an advisory board, and for giving advice. 
Perhaps they believe that the inexorable decrease in reimbursement for our medical 
services is a good reason to accept some money from the industry to offset what we 
believe is inequitable loss of practice income. Or, they may believe that what they 
are doing for industry is a service to medical profession and to the colleagues who 
come to hear them speak. At any rate, they like money. They even like the indirect 
benefits that they do not receive as cash: receptions and dinners paid for by the 
industry, or tax-excerpt courses or courses requiring a reduced registration fee. All 
these benefits mean money they do not have to spend  
 
Industry perspective 
Their bottom-line duty is to augment value to their stockholders: to make 
money (Goldratt E., 2004). If a company sells soap, refrigerators, drugs, or medical 
devices, the stockholders want to see profit. If a company makes what seems to be 
an altruistic donation, it is a business-centred act. The gift may do some good in a 
community or in other ways, but the company’s stockholders do not want the 
company to act like a charity entity and to spend money that has no business 
purpose. What is, then, industry buying with some of the $57.5 billion it spends 
annually on marketing to physicians – $ 61,000 per physician – or nearly twice as 
much as the expenditure for research and development? 
Industry buys access, authority, and appreciation. These are knotted. When 
a company sets up a steakhouse dinner reunion, it needs a lecturer to make the meal 
simply incidental to a didactic activity and, therefore, tolerable under various 
physician–industry gifting guidelines. 
Companies do much of their marketing to physicians by means of their 
ever-increasing influence on CME and through payments or gifts to both physician 
teachers and meeting attendees. In 2006, industry covered the cost of 61% of 
Continuous Medical Education Courses in US, spending nearly $1.45 billion, or 
more than three times what it spent in 1998. In the circumstance of advancing its 
shareholders’ joint interests, this activity is simply business motivated.  
Industry aims at leaders because of their reputation and the admiration held 
by their colleagues. In academia, there are verdicts on pharmaceutical formularies 
and on research projects and policies that industry has an interest in influencing 
and that academic institutions should have an interest in keeping free from 
industry’s influence (Ehringhaus et al., 2008; Rothman, 2008). In professional 
organizations, the clinical care guidelines they create are an attractive prey for the 
industry; having grateful committee members on these guideline panels can yield 
positive results to industry’s products (Steinbrook, 2007).  
 
Academic perspective 
Academic physicians author many of the articles published in journals and 
they are involved in research that may be of interest to industry. Thus, academic 
departments are high importance targets of industry and are lured by the same 
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stimulus as their faculty and community physicians – entitlement, recognition, 
belonging, and money – to become comfortable with industry representatives. 
It may be a visiting professor agenda that industry is enthusiastic to 
sponsor. Finally, the department has to fight to meet its financial plan and 
industry’s money is simply money that the department will not have to spend. 
Maybe the company offers money for the department to test a new device or to join 
in a clinical trial. These examples are ways in which industry can gain influence 
with the chair and faculty of the department and with its house staff.  
Campbell and associates surveyed department chairs at medical schools 
and at US’s 15 largest teaching hospitals (Campbell et al., 2007). Sixty per cent of 
chairs had some form of personal relation with the industry such as being a paid 
consultant or a scientific advisory board member or participating in a speaker’s 
bureau. In addition, some 80% of clinical departments had one or more connections 
with industry, including funding for food and for CME. Most chairs did not 
perceive anything wrong with these personal or departmental affairs.  
 
Conclusions 
Even though industry has brought to market many of the products that have 
helped improving  medicine, there is major concern and strong confirmation that 
industry’s successful marketing tactics have entailed an unreasonable increase  in  
the cost of health. Individual physicians have proven to be sitting targets for the 
pharmaceutical and device industry and it is least likely to change their behavior, 
unless bold steps are taken in order to support and  even to implement such 
changes. 
In the end, it is essential to reiterate that this perspectives does not put an 
end to the physician-industry relation. On the other hand, we hope that physicians 
will identify their physician-industry voluntary financial relations for what they 
are: a conflict of interests over their responsibility to patients and to the public. The 
difference needs to be made, though, between interactions that have very specific 
aims, goals that stand to our patients’ and public advantage and those that simply 
increase the cost of care through encouragement of needless drugs and tests or the 




• Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA code on interactions 
with healthcare professionals, 2004. 
•  American Medical Association, Updated clarification on opinion E-8.061: gifts to 
physicians from industry, 1998. 
• Elliott C., Pharma goes to the laundry: public relations and the business of medical 
education, Hastings Cent Rep 34:18-23, 2004. 
• Campbell, E. G., J. S. Weissman, S. Ehringhaus, S. R. Rao, B. Moy, S. Feibelmann, and 
S. D. Goold, Institutional academic industry relationships, JAMA 298 (15):1779-86, 
2007. 
 28
• Chren, M. M., Interactions between physicians and drug company representatives, Am J 
Med 107 (2):182-3, 1999. 
• Ehringhaus, S. H., J. S. Weissman, J. L. Sears, S. D. Goold, S. Feibelmann, and E. G. 
Campbell, Responses of medical schools to institutional conflicts of interest, JAMA 299 
(6):665-71, 2008. 
• Goldratt E, Cox J., The goal: a process of ongoing improvement, Edited by N. R. Press. 
Great Barrington, Massachusetts, 2004. 
• Greene, J. A., Pharmaceutical marketing research and the prescribing physician, Ann 
Intern Med , 146 (10):742-8, 2007. 
• Hayashi, J., Free meals from the pharmaceutical industry. JAMA 285 (2):164-5; author 
reply 165-6, 2001. 
• Network., Pharma Marketing, Key opinion leader, 2004. 
• Popp, R. J. et al., ACCF/AHA consensus conference report on professionalism and 
ethics, Circulation 110 (16):2506-49, 2004. 
• Rothman, D. J., Academic medical centers and financial conflicts of interest, JAMA 299 
(6):695-7, 2008. 
• Rutledge P., Crookes D., McKinstry B., Maxwell SR. Do doctors rely on 
pharmaceutical industry funding to attend conferences and do they perceive that this 
creates a bias in their drug selection? Results from a questionnaire survey, 
Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Safety 12:663-667, 2003. 
• Spingarn, R. W., J. A. Berlin, and B. L. Strom, When pharmaceutical manufacturers' 
employees present grand rounds, what do residents remember? Acad Med 71 (1):86-8, 
1996. 
• Steinbrook, R., Guidance for guidelines, N Engl J Med 356 (4):331-3, 2007. 
• Steinman, M. A., L. A. Bero, M. M. Chren, and C. S. Landefeld, Narrative review: the 
promotion of gabapentin: an analysis of internal industry documents, Ann Intern Med 
145 (4):284-93, 2006. 
• Tonelli, M. R., Conflict of interest in clinical practice, Chest 132 (2):664-70, 2007. 
• Wazana, A., Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift? 
JAMA 283 (3):373-80, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
